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Cognitive Inflexibility Among Ruminators
and Nonruminators
Robert N. Davis1,2 and Susan Nolen-Hoeksema1
Dysphoric people who ruminate about their negative mood experience longer and
more intense depressive episodes, yet often persist in ruminating. This study investi-
gated whether a ruminative coping style would be related to a cognitive style marked
by perseveration and inflexibility. We examined the performance of ruminators and
nonruminators on the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST), a measure of cognitive
flexibility, and tasks measuring related cognitive processes. Ruminators committed
significantly more perseverative errors and failed to maintain set significantly more
often than nonruminators on the WCST. On an advanced section of the WCST
designed for this study, male ruminators exhibited significantly greater inflexibility
than male nonruminators. These effects could not be attributed to differences in
general intelligence or the presence of depressed mood. Results suggest that rumination
may be characterized by, and perhaps prolonged by, an inflexible cognitive style.
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INTRODUCTION
When they become depressed or dysphoric, some people engage in rumination
(Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). Rumination involves behaviors and thoughts that pas-
sively focus one’s attention on one’s depressive symptoms and on the implications
of these symptoms. Examples can include sitting alone thinking about how tired
and unmotivated one feels, worrying that one’s symptoms will interfere with one’s
job, and passively reviewing all the things wrong in one’s life that might be contribut-
ing to one’s depression. People engaging in ruminative responses may worry about
the causes and consequences of their depression, but they do not take action to
change their situation, and they spend much of their time thinking about how badly
they feel (Carver, Scheier, & Weintraub, 1989; Lyubomirsky, Caldwell, & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1998; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991).
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Both laboratory and field studies have shown that people who ruminate when
depressed or dysphoric have longer and more severe periods of depressed mood
than those who do not (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993, 1995; Nolen-
Hoeksema, Morrow, & Fredrickson, 1993; Nolen-Hoeksema, Parker & Larson,
1994; Wood, Saltzberg, Neale, Stone, & Rachmiel, 1990). For example, one longitu-
dinal study found that bereaved people who tended to ruminate about their de-
pressive symptoms 1 month after their loss were more severely depressed 6 months
after their loss than bereaved people who did not tend to ruminate, even after
taking into account initial levels of depressive symptoms at 1 month post-loss
(Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1994). Another recent study found that college students
with a ruminative style had more new onsets of major depressive disorder during
college years than those without a ruminative style (Alloy & Abramson, 1997).
Laboratory studies find that inducing depressed or dysphoric people to ruminate
(to focus on their current feeling state and self-evaluations) results in elevation in
their depressed moods, whereas inducing depressed or dysphoric people to distract
from ongoing ruminations results in significant decrease in depressed mood (Barden,
Garber, Leiman, Ford, & Masters, 1985; Fennell & Teasdale, 1984; Gibbons et al.,
1985; Lyubomirsky et al., 1998; Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993, 1995).
Further, rumination in the context of a dysphoric mood is associated with
increased recall of negative autobiographical memories, more negative interpreta-
tions of current situations, more negative predictions about one’s future, and less
effective interpersonal problem solving (Lyubomirsky et al., 1998; Lyubomirsky &
Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995; Pyszczynski, Holt, & Greenberg, 1987; Strack, Blaney,
Ganellen, & Coyne, 1985). Taken together, these findings indicate that rumination
maintains depressed mood and thinking. A further matter to be resolved is how
ruminative responses themselves are maintained.
Why Do Some People Ruminate?
There is evidence from longitudinal studies (Nolen-Hoeksema & Davis, 1998;
Nolen-Hoeksema & Larson, 1998), field studies (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1993),
and studies of previously depressed individuals (Roberts, Gilboa, & Gotlib, 1998)
which suggests that rumination is a stable individual difference characteristic. Given
that rumination is associated with longer and more severe periods of depressive
symptoms, why do some people ruminate? Lyubomirsky and Nolen-Hoeksema
(1993) found that dysphoric rumination reduced people’s willingness to engage in
pleasant, distracting activities (e.g., going out to dinner with friends) although people
felt they would enjoy such activities. Additionally, people induced to ruminate in
response to depressed mood felt they were gaining insight into their problems
and feelings, which may further encourage rumination (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1993). Thus, two self-perpetuating properties of dysphoric rumination
may be decreased willingness to engage in mood-lifting activities and an enhanced
sense of gaining insight from ruminating.
Cognitive Inflexibility and Rumination
One further possible explanation for why people continue to engage in rumina-
tion despite its negative consequences is that rumination is a manifestation of a
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more general tendency toward cognitive inflexibility, or perseveration. Indeed,
ruminations have been described as ‘‘perseverating self-focused thoughts’’ (Hertel,
1998). Perseveration is defined as failure to modify behavior effectively when given
feedback, modulate behavior in light of expected future consequences, and adjust
one’s cognitive set in the face of changing environmental contingencies (Lezak,
1995). Several studies have found that depressed and dysphoric people exhibit
perseveration (Channon, 1996; Franke, Maier, Hardt, & Frieboes, 1993; Martin,
Oren, & Boone, 1991; Silberman, Weingartner, & Post, 1983). Moreover, it has
been suggested that people who exhibit significant perseveration may have a difficult
time changing the way they think and feel, or engaging in hypothesis testing that
might facilitate disconfirmation of depressive cognitive schemata (Crews & Har-
rison, 1995; Martin et al., 1991). People who are cognitively inflexible may tend to
ruminate when feeling sad because they have difficulty generating alternative ways
of coping. Cognitive inflexibility may also increase rumination because it makes it
difficult for people to switch their attention away from themselves and their prob-
lems to pleasant, distracting topics or activities. If cognitive inflexibility is one
contributor to rumination, then ruminators should exhibit deficits in their ability
to abandon ineffective cognitive behavior and have trouble maintaining effective
cognitive behavior. Importantly, these effects must be independent of individual
differences in depressed mood, which is frequently associated with rumination, or
intellectual functioning, which can confound the measurement of cognitive flexibility
(e.g., Martin et al., 1991).
Overview of the Present Study
In the present study, we examined the relationship between the tendency to
ruminate and performance on a measure of cognitive flexibility. We hypothesized
that ruminators would exhibit greater cognitive inflexibility than nonruminators.
The primary focus of the study was on participants’ performance on the Wisconsin
Card Sorting Test (WCST; Grant & Berg, 1948). The aim of the WCST is to
determine what rule should be used to sort cards to match key cards that vary
in three stimulus dimensions (color, shape, and number). Feedback is given to
participants about correct and incorrect matches. The task permits an assessment
of participants’ adroitness at adapting their cognitive set to changing environmental
contingencies.
We also included measures of working memory, reasoning, and task switching
based on previous findings that these cognitive processes covary with dysphoria-
related perseveration on the WCST (Davis & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998). Moreover,
these cognitive processes appear to contribute to WCST performance in other
populations (e.g., Gold, Carpenter, Randolph, Goldberg, & Weinberger, 1997).
Furthermore, Hertel (1998) found that dysphoric people induced to ruminate exhib-
ited poorer memory on a controlled retrieval task. It is therefore necessary to
assess these cognitive functions in addition to cognitive inflexibility to determine
if rumination is associated with global or specific cognitive deficits.
Previous research on cognitive and neuropsychological functioning in depres-
sion has paid scant attention to gender issues (Heller, 1993). Gender differences
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have been found in WCST performance. In a sample of 91 healthy middle-aged
participants, men exhibited significantly greater perseveration than women (Boone,
Ghaffarian, Lesser, Hill-Gutierrez, & Berman, 1993). Men with schizophrenia also
have exhibited greater perseveration than women with schizophrenia (Seidman et
al., 1997). To assess the possible impact of gender on the cognitive tasks used in
this study, gender was included as an independent variable in all analyses.
To ensure that any differences found between ruminators and nonruminators
would be a function of rumination, and not simply byproducts of depressed mood,
it was necessary in the present study to measure depressed mood and control for
its effects statistically. Furthermore, to investigate whether differences between
ruminators and nonruminators would relate specifically to problems in cognitive
flexibility rather than to problems in related cognitive processes, such as working
memory, task switching, and reasoning, we included measures of these cognitive
variables as well. Finally, because one previous study found a relationship between
depression and WCST performance only after controlling for intellectual function-
ing (Martin et al., 1991), we included a measure of intellectual functioning to ensure
group equivalence on this variable.
METHOD
Participants
Sixty-two participants were recruited from courses at a large midwestern univer-
sity and received $15 for their participation. All participants spoke English as their
primary language and were between 18 and 25 years of age (M  20.27, SD 
1.54). Participants were selected based on their answers to a shortened (10-item)
form of the Ruminative Responses Scale (RRS) of the Response Styles Question-
naire (RSQ; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991). This scale assesses how partici-
pants tend to respond to their own symptoms of negative emotion. The original
RRS includes 22 items describing responses to depressed mood that are self-focused
(e.g., I think, ‘‘Why do I react this way?’’), symptom-focused (e.g., I think about
how hard it is to concentrate), and focused on the possible causes and consequences
of one’s mood (e.g., I think ‘‘I won’t be able to do my job if I don’t snap out of
this’’). Scores on this scale show good test–retest reliability (Nolen-Hoeksema et
al., 1994) as well as acceptable convergent and predictive validity (Butler & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1994; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1994).
Because of time constraints in the current study, we used a 10-item version of this
questionnaire to select participants. The 10 items on this shortened scale were
based on item analyses conducted with a community sample of 1122 adults (Nolen-
Hoeksema, unpublished data). The 10 items from the RRS that correlated most
strongly with total scores on the longer scale, and on which at least 15% of the
sample endorsed an answer other than ‘‘never,’’ were chosen for inclusion on the
shortened scale. The internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha) of this 10-item scale
in the community sample of 1122 was .87, and the correlation between this 10-item
scale and the total 22-item scale was .93.
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Participants were assigned to one of two groups depending upon their score on
the 10-item version of the RRS and conceptual–empirical criteria for distinguishing
ruminators from nonruminators. Participants who did not endorse more than one
ruminative response as one that they ‘‘often’’ or ‘‘always’’ engaged in when de-
pressed were assigned to the nonruminator group. Participants who endorsed 5 or
more ruminative responses as ones that they ‘‘often’’ or ‘‘always’’ engaged in when
depressed were assigned to the ruminator group. This yielded one group of 31
nonruminators (15 males, 16 females) and another group of 31 ruminators (15
males, 16 females).
Materials
Beck Depression Inventory-Short Form
The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, &
Erbaugh, 1961) is one of the most widely used self-report instruments for detecting
depression in normal populations. The 13-item short form of the BDI (BDI-SF;
Beck and Beck, 1972), which correlates .96 with the long form, was used in this study.
Primary Mental Abilities (PMA)—Reasoning Subtest
The Reasoning subtest from the Primary Mental Abilities test (PMA; Thur-
stone and Thurstone, 1949) was used to assess reasoning ability. In this task, partici-
pants attempt to induce an ordering principle and choose the next letter in a series
from sets of alphabetic strings, such as ‘‘A B D C D D E F D ?’’ The task was
administered in its standardized format.
Backward Digit Span
The Backward Digit Span subscale from the WAIS-R (Wechsler, 1981) was
used to assess working memory capacity. In this task, the experimenter presents
groups of digits orally to the participant. Participants are asked to repeat the digits
immediately back to the experimenter in the reverse order.
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST)
The WCST was used to measure cognitive flexibility. It was administered and
scored in its standardized format (Heaton, Chelune, Talley, Kay, & Curtiss, 1993).
In the WCST, participants attempt to determine what rule should be used to sort
cards to match key cards that vary in three stimulus dimensions (color, shape, and
number). The task begins with four key cards (1: red triangle; 2: green stars; 3:
yellow crosses; and 4: blue circles) arranged in a row in view of the participant.
Participants then draw cards from two decks of 64 cards arranged in a fixed random
order and attempt to match each card to one of the four key cards. The experimenter
provides feedback about correct and incorrect matches. Following 10 correct succes-
sive matches, the experimenter changes the correct sorting principle without in-
forming the participant. The task continues until the participant sorts cards correctly
according to all six categories or runs out of cards.
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To ensure that the WCST would discriminate effectively in this sample, the
task was expanded to include three additional categories. Two of these three new
categories were more difficult than the original categories and required the grasp
of a more abstract principle. The seventh category, Addition, was correctly matched
when the number of shapes on a sorted card was one greater than the key card to
which it was matched. (The key card with four blue dots required a card with one
shape on it to be considered correct, as the rule was circular and limited to the
numbers 1–4.) The eighth category was one of the original three (color, shape, or
number) randomly selected. The ninth category, Subtraction, was correctly matched
when the number of shapes on a sorted card was one less than the key card to
which it was matched. (The key card with one red triangle required a card with
four shapes on it to be considered correct.) We refer to these three additional
categories as the WCST Advanced Section (WCST-AS). Because the transition
from the final WCST category to the first WCST-AS category was hypothesized to
be especially difficult, a score was derived from the total number of trials in which
a sorting dimension from the WCST (color, shape, or number) was used following
an instance of its disconfirmation at the onset of the seventh category (i.e., the
beginning of the WCST-AS). This score is reported here as ‘‘inflexible sorts.’’
Vocabulary Subscale
The Vocabulary subscale of the WAIS-R was used as a measure of general
intellectual ability since it has the best individual correlation with WAIS-R Full
Scale IQ (Wechsler, 1981). The task was administered and scored in its standardized
format (Wechsler, 1981).
Colors Subtest
The Colors subtest (CS; adapted from Zazzo, 1969) was used as a measure of
task switching. In this task, participants are presented with a grid of dots that are
red, blue, yellow, and green and situated in a random order. For the first trial, they
are instructed to point to each dot and name its color aloud as quickly as possible.
After 15 sec, they are abruptly directed to name the colors of the dots again, but
to say ‘‘blue’’ when they see a red dot and ‘‘red’’ whenever they see a blue dot.
After another 15 sec, they are abruptly instructed to name the actual colors of the
dots, just as in the first trial. Finally, they are interrupted once again after 15 sec
and instructed to name the color of the dots one final time, but saying ‘‘blue’’
whenever they see a red dot and ‘‘red’’ whenever they see a blue dot. Scores are
obtained for the number of red and blue dots named correctly in each of the four
trials. A weighted score is then obtained by summing scores on the first and third
(naming) trials and then dividing by the sum of the second and fourth (switch-
ing) trials.
Procedure
The RRS, BDI-SF, and a demographics questionnaire were administered to
groups of potential participants in screening sessions 1–2 weeks before the labora-
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tory sessions in which the cognitive tasks were administered. People who met the
selection criteria for being either ruminators or nonruminators were called and
invited to participate in a study of ‘‘cognition and personality.’’ They were not told
the specific basis on which they were selected or anything about the hypotheses of
the study. One to 2 weeks after completing the RRS and BDI-SF, participants came
to our laboratory to complete the cognitive tasks. All participants were tested
individually and the experimenter was blind to participants’ rumination status.
RESULTS
Analysis of Group Characteristics
Rumination group and gender differences were assessed using 2  2 ANOVAs.
These analyses revealed no gender or rumination group differences in general
intelligence as measured by the WAIS-R vocabulary subscale, p  .05. Moreover,
Vocabulary scores were not significantly correlated with any other measure in this
study, all ps  .10. Given these results, we did not use Vocabulary scores as a
covariate in our later analyses. However, a main effect of rumination group did
emerge on BDI-SF scores, F(1,58)  20.84, p  .01. Because previous research has
found correlations between depression and the cognitive measures used in this
study (e.g., Channon, 1996; Channon, Baker, & Robertson, 1993), participants’
BDI-SF scores were entered as a covariate in all subsequent analyses.
Analyses of Cognitive Variables
Table I presents the means and standard deviations of the cognitive variables
by rumination group and gender. Table II presents the intercorrelations among the
cognitive variables for all participants. We assessed rumination group and gender
differences on the cognitive measures using a series of 2  2 ANCOVAs, with
mean scores for each task as dependent variables. Ruminators committed signifi-
cantly more perseverative errors than nonruminators, F(1,56)  5.52, p  .05, and
failed to maintain set significantly more often than nonruminators, F(1,56)  4.09,
p  .05, on the WCST.3 The groups did not differ significantly in the number of
nonperseverative errors, p  .05. No significant main effects of gender or significant
interactions between rumination group and gender were found on these variables.
On the WCST-AS,4 there were no main effects of rumination group or gender.
However, two significant rumination group  gender interactions were found. There
was a significant interaction between rumination group and gender on the percent-
3In analyses recommended by an anonymous reviewer, we found that these main effects remained
significant even when vocabulary, reasoning, working memory, task switching, and depression were
entered simultaneously as covariates.
4Four participants (one female nonruminator, one male ruminator, and two female ruminators) did not
attempt the WCST-AS because they used up all 128 cards on the standard WCST.
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Table I. Mean Scores of Male and Female Ruminators and Nonruminators on Cognitive Tasks
Males Females
Ruminators Nonruminators Ruminators Nonruminators
M M M M
Measure (SD) (SD) (SD) (SD)
Backward Digit Span 5.67 6.00 5.63 5.69
(1.80) (1.56) (1.09) (1.62)
Reasoning 21.87 25.33 24.13 24.00
(5.07) (3.13) (3.90) (4.43)
Colors 1.21 1.21 1.18 1.14
(0.19) (0.27) (0.23) (0.16)
Vocabulary 56.80 52.73 51.63 51.94
(8.69) (10.86) (7.47) (5.97)
WCST measures
Perseverative errors 8.47 5.67 9.69 8.13
(5.76) (1.18) (7.74) (3.16)
Nonperseverative errors 6.80 4.60 6.06 7.75
(5.03) (1.92) (4.22) (6.93)
Failure to maintain set 1.00 0.20 0.37 0.13
(1.25) (0.41) (0.72) (0.34)
WCST-AS measures
Percent inflexible sorts 44.57 36.64 32.21 42.80
(14.17) (11.98) (19.48) (20.75)
Percent perseverative 12.14 9.71 8.43 12.13
errors (4.88) (2.92) (4.47) (7.95)
Percent nonperseverative 45.00 37.50 37.57 44.87
errors (17.77) (19.57) (16.76) (14.72)
age of inflexible sorts in the seventh category, F(1,52)  4.78, p  .05.5 Also on
the WCST-AS, significant rumination group  gender interactions were found on
the percentage of perseverative errors, F(1,52)  5.33, p  .05. The rumination
group  gender interaction on the percentage of nonperseverative errors was not
significant, p  .05.
The nature of the significant rumination group  gender interactions on the
WCST-AS was investigated in post-hoc comparisons of ruminators and nonrumina-
tors within each gender separately (still using BDI-SF scores as a covariate). On
the WCST-AS, there was a significant difference between male ruminators and
male nonruminators on the number of inflexible sorts, F(1,25)  4.14, p  .05, but
differences on the percentage of perseverative errors were not statistically signifi-
cant, ps  .05. Despite the overall rumination group  gender interactions, no
differences between female ruminators and female nonruminators were statistically
significant on these variables, both ps  .05.
Regarding the other cognitive tasks, on the Reasoning subtest, there were no
significant main effects of gender or rumination group, but a significant interaction
between rumination group and gender was found, F(1,56)  4.07, p  .05. Post-hoc
analyses showed no significant difference between ruminators and nonruminators
5Percentages rather than raw scores are reported for these measures because the number of trials
on the WCST-AS varied as a function of WCST performance, e.g., someone who committed many
perseverative errors on the WCST would have had fewer overall trials on the WCST-AS since 128
total cards were used for both tasks combined.
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within either gender on this task, however. There were no significant main effects
of rumination group or gender, nor significant interactions, on measures of working
memory or task switching performance, all ps  .05.
DISCUSSION
In this study, we attempted to determine if rumination would be associated
with cognitive inflexibility. In addition, we were interested in examining any possible
relationships rumination might have with other cognitive variables. The results
support our hypothesis that rumination is associated with a tendency to perseverate:
ruminators committed more perseverative errors on the WCST than nonruminators.
Moreover, rumination was associated with problems in maintaining an adaptive
set: ruminators failed to maintain set more often on the WCST than nonruminators.
These findings suggest that ruminators have difficulty adapting their cognitive set
to changing environmental contingencies. Ruminators become mentally ‘‘stuck’’ in
a style of relating to the environment even when the adaptiveness of that style has
been invalidated by negative feedback. Moreover, ruminators prematurely abandon
adaptive cognitive sets. Ruminators therefore have trouble inhibiting perseverative
tendencies and maintaining adaptive tendencies.
Our results also suggest that the cognitive impairments exhibited by ruminators
on these tasks are specific to difficulties with maintaining an adaptive cognitive
set and abandoning a maladaptive cognitive set. Ruminators did not differ from
nonruminators on measures of working memory or task switching, and follow-up
tests did not clarify the rumination  gender interaction found on our reasoning
task. These results imply that rumination is not characterized by problems in cogni-
tion generally.
These findings are consistent with studies of dysphoric individuals that have
found cognitive impairment under conditions in which attention is poorly controlled,
in contrast to conditions in which attention is focused on the relevant task (Hertel,
1997, 1998). In the present study, ruminators exhibited perseveration when required
to self-initiate cognitive set shifting, whereas they did not evidence difficulty on a
measure of task switching in which they were explicitly instructed to change response
set while under time pressure. Attention-demanding tasks have also been shown
to disrupt rumination in depressed states (Teasdale et al., 1995). Taken together,
these findings suggest that manipulations of the external environment may facilitate
distraction and decrease opportunities for self-focused rumination. However, cogni-
tive inflexibility may hinder ruminators from taking the incipient initiative at select-
ing environments that minimize opportunities for self-focused rumination. For ex-
ample, dysphoric ruminators rated the perceived enjoyment of several activities no
differently than dysphoric individuals who distracted themselves and nondysphoric
individuals, yet reported less willingness to engage in such activities (Lyubomirsky &
Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993).
Furthermore, we found that male ruminators exhibited greater cognitive
rigidity compared to male nonruminators on the WCST-AS when abdication of
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useless strategies and production of new ones was required for successful
performance. Surprisingly, the association between rumination and perseveration
was not as consistent among the women as among the men on the WCST-AS.
On the WCST-AS, female ruminators did not score significantly differently from
female nonruminators, whereas male ruminators did score significantly differently
from male nonruminators on the number of inflexible sorts. However, the gender
 rumination interactions on the WCST-AS should be interpreted cautiously
both because they were not predicted and because not all participants attempted
the WCST-AS.
Several studies have shown that men are less likely to report and to be observed
engaging in rumination and emotion focusing around sad moods than are women
(Butler & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1994; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1993, 1994). When a
man does become a ruminator, however, this coping style may be part of a more
pervasive problem with cognitive inflexibility and allocation of cognitive resources.
In contrast, a recent study suggests that the sources of rumination for women may
be rooted more in their social environment—their lack of power and affirmation
in their relationships and their lack of resources (Nolen-Hoeksema & Larson, 1998).
This social environment may lead women to engage in rumination even when they
do not have more general problems with cognitive inflexibility and allocation of
cognitive resources.
There are two important differences between the current study and previous
studies of rumination and cognition. First, the previous studies all focused on
self-relevant materials, e.g., solving self-relevant interpersonal problems. Because
rumination involves focusing on depression-related memories, events, and feelings,
it is not surprising that it might have a stronger effect on self-relevant cognitions
than on the non-self-relevant cognitive processing assessed in this study.
Second, in all our previous studies, we have induced dysphoric and nondys-
phoric participants to ruminate or distract from ruminations, then had them com-
plete cognitive tasks. These rumination and distraction inductions may produce
stronger differences in cognitive processing in both men and women in the labora-
tory compared to selecting participants based on their RRS scores. We emphasize,
however, that there were differences between the ruminators and nonruminators
among both the men and women on the standard WCST. Whereas we considered
using rumination and distraction inductions in the current study, we chose not to
do so because the cognitive tasks used in this study are natural distraction inductions.
Thus, we expected any effects of a rumination induction to be quickly wiped out
by the cognitive tasks (Brockner & Hulton, 1978).
The tendency to ruminate when dysphoric may be a consequence of cognitive
inflexibility and perseveration. People who cannot inhibit perseverative tendencies
and who fail to maintain productive lines of reasoning may become trapped in
nonproductive perseveration on negative moods and events that they experience.
Alternately, preoccupation with one’s negative moods and life circumstances may
decrease confidence in one’s judgments, leading to perseveration and the abandon-
ment of productive reasoning. Whether the cognitive impairments observed are a
cause or consequence of rumination, they may contribute to difficulties in problem
solving that help to perpetuate negative mood.
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